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tification or even of kinship.
Sadly, perper
haps, we must admit the i.rmlense resistance
human beings present to recognizing obligaobliga
tions even to individuals of their own race
and species without a prior denonstration of
sane sort of kinship. "Blood is thicker than
water. "
The author of the medieval Chanson
de Roland expressed this parochial conviction
with admirable succinctness; "Christians are
right (unt droit); pagans are wrong."
The
old British device invokes "Dieu et ITDn
droit" (Gcd and my right), not the rights of
others.

In his extraordinary work,
Animals I
Rights, first p.ililished in 1892, Henry Salt,
although giving much credit to humanitarian
feeling in antiquity and the Renaissance,
situated the first true develofXOOIlt of the
concept of animal rights in the EnlightenEnlighten
ment.
"It was not until the eighteenth cencen
tury, the age of enlightenment and 'sensibi'sensibi
lity' of which Voltaire and Rousseau were the
spokesmen, " he wrote, "that the rights of
animals obtained ITDre deliberate recognition"
(p. 4).
Indeed, in our contemporary underunder
standing of the word, all of its variants and
offshoots (the rights of man, of the citizen,
of WOllen, slaves, prisoners, gays--and of
animals, too) stem fran that period when the
European bourgeoisie, and by extension the
American as well, formulated a revolutionary
ideology that, in the language of the time,
called for liberation fran tyranny, desdes
potism, and oppression and vindicated liberalibera
tive action by the elaboration of a network
of "rights"--aITDng them life, liberty, and
the prrsuit of happiness, as well as sane
that we might consider ITDre esoteric, like
the right to own property, but which Voltaire
likened to the cry of nature.

Rousseau and Voltaire inherited fran
their recent past as a target for criticism
an analysis of man's radical difference fran
other living creatures that was riddled with
contradictions but had acquired status bebe
cause of the unquestionable brilliance of its
author, the great Rene Descartes.
in an
effort doubtless directed both toward councoun
tering accusations of heresy and justifying
the use of animals in experimentation ("ab("ab
solving men fran the suspicion of crime," in
his words) , Descartes argued that animals
were natural automata, incapable of thought
and feeling and ITDved by divinely created
mechanisms analogous to the ingenious springspring
operated clockwork devices that human beings
had used to give a semblance of life to their
own inanimate creations.
(If one leaves Gcd
out of the equation, Descartes' explanation
of animal behavior is not very far fran the
one that present-day behavioristic sociosocio
biologists offer for the conduct of human
beings, whose every gesture is dictated by an
inherited genetic code and who can find virvir
tue or vice in pills or liquid potions, much
like their literary ITDdel, Stevenson's Dr.

Neither Rousseau nor Voltaire can probprob
ably be considered a major contributor to the
develofXOOIlt of the concept of animal rights,
but Salt's words are no less true for that.
More direct attacks on human mistreatment of
animals in the name of their innate (if not
Gcd-given) rights and on the ITDdel of the
ongoing struggle for human rights (not just
those of the male, white bourgeoisie but of
WOllen, slaves, proletarians, and colonial
peoples) found their source in the writings
of the Enlightenment PrilosoIilers,
aITDng
them, Rousseau and Voltaire, who both adad
dressed themselves to the question
relation between rnen and beasts.
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Jekyll.)
Why God endowed these insentient
lOOchanical creatures with a canplete set of
sensory organs remarkably similar to those of
human beings, Descartes failed to explain,
although he clearly was aware of this anbaranbar
rassing impediment to the plausibility of his
arguwent and admitted that the presence of
those organs might lead less subtle minds
than his to the false conclusion that animals
were capable of sensation.

ship with those species that even he concon
tinued to call the "lower orders." Born with
what Darwin called "a pedigree of prodigious
length," man owes that birth to a long line
of non-human progenitors.
"Unless we willwill
fully close our eyes," Darwin concluded in
his chapter on the genealogy of man, "we may,
with our present knowledge, approximately
recognize our parentage." "Nor," he added,
"need we feel ashamed of it" (The Descent of
-Man, chapter VI).
Darwin was not the first

With this over-easy dismissal of a grave
IOOral problem that had troubled others for
centuries, Descartes affirms a sanewhat fafa
cile seal to the position that there is a
radical and absolute difference,
an unun
bridgeable gulf separating humanity fran all
other creatures on earth (theologians were
willing to speculate on our possible kinship
with demons and angels, distant cousins in
heaven or hell, related to us by their intelintel
lect) •
One of the problems Descartes' posiposi
tion created for him was that it was irreconirrecon
cilable with a belief in evolution, and there
seem to be sane hints that he thought the
evolutionary process not inconceivable.
A
century later, the naturalist Buffon would
adopt a similarly contradictory stance, adad
hering to orthodox Christian belief in the
idea of separate creation for humankind, but
also clearly aware of the many functional and
structural resemblances between us and other
animals. Obviously, acceptance of the impliimpli
cations of zoological observation required
either exceptional courage or the advent of
an era in which Christian dogma would be put
on the defensiv8.
Needless to say, Voltaire
and Rousseau not only lived in such an era,
as Buffon did, too, but possessed extraordiextraordi
nary courage.
Discreet as Voltaire could be
and timid as Rousseau surely was in many
situations, they jeopardized their freedan

to reject the belief that man is the work of
a separate act of creation, although his wriwri
tings went farther to establish the certainty
of our tilysical relatedness to other animals
than any had before.
But if we distinguish
the "scientific" deIOOnstration of a literal
family-tree sort of kinship fran the sentisenti
ment of sharing in a cemoon nature, involving
both tilysical and spiritual relatedness, then
Voltaire and Rousseau are readily identifiidentifi
able aIOOng Darwin's predecesors--more than
Descartes and Buffon, who, ironically, are
sozretimes perceived as in the lineage of the
evolutionist tililosotilers.

and even their lives with much of what
wrote.

***
'The best text to cite fran Voltaire is
surely the short piece entitled
"Betes"
(beasts) in the original 1764 edition of the
Dictionnaire prilosophique, included by Tern
Regan and Peter Singer in Animal Rights and
Human Obligations (pp. 67-69), under the
title of 'A Reply to Descartes." It is unun
mistakably a refutation of Descartes' posiposi
tion, although he is not named in the arar
ticle.
Voltaire does not mince words, hawhaw
ever.
He denounces the poverty of spirit of
those who claim that animals are machines
deprived of awareness and feeling (connias(connias
~
et sentiment).
Descartes had argued
that articulate speech constitutes the only
evidence of capacity for feeling or for memomemo
ry or ideas.
Voltaire, in seeking to demondemon
strate the vacuity of this arguwent (really
no IOOre than an assertion) describes in dede
tail the compelling evidence of a dog's
feelings of grief, pain, and joy in the form
of what present-day linguists might call
"non-~tic" behavior.
In refreshingly uninunin
hibited language, he does not hesitate to
describe as "barbarisms" the vivisectionists
as he pictures them seiZing the dog "who
surpasses man so prodigiously in friendship,"
nailing him to a table, and cutting him up
alive.
"Answer loo, lOOchanic (machiniste),

they

It would be extravagant, however, to see
either of these two as putting his neck on
the block for animals' rights, or even as
considering this a central issue.
Neither
one--and this is not to their discredit-discredit-
went so far in his repudiation of the CarCar
tesian characterization of aniJreJ.s as Darwin
would in the next century, IOOSt explicitly in
The Descent of Man.
Darwin's writing--and
this was for many of his contemp::>raries, as
it still is today for "Creationists," the
IOOst horrifying aspect of it---tended toward a
recognition of a literal blood relationship
or consanguinity, our true family relationrelation
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tience with what he considered futile rretarreta
physical questions and the kind. of vaporous
mentality he associated with them.
He also
uses the question to reassert the attribution

has nature arranged all the springs of feelfeel
ing in this animal so that it should not
feel?"
(It is significant and, of course,
characteristic that, while Descartes desdes
cribed the body as a machine made by the
hands of God, Voltaire identifies the archiarchi
teet of creation as Nature herself, thus
distancing himself from orthodox Christian
theism. )

of feeling, nerory, and thought (limited,
perhaps, to "a certain number of ideas") by
the same supreme being who makes grass grow
and subjected the earth to the sun's gravitagravita
tional force, thus reminding his readers of
his preference for Newton above Aristotle and
Descartes, as a true ideologist of the EnEn
lightenment.

Vol taire' s language is direct, clear ,
unambiguous, and forceful. He appeals to the
reader's cx:xrrron sense and to his personal
observations and experience of life.
He
addressed the unnamed Descartes and those who
think as he does directly with the familiar
tu, abolishing distance and formality and
creating, as it were, the illusion of diadia
logue and, with it, life and IlIOvement. LastLast
ly, he does not dissociate theory and pracprac
tice, as a IlIOre timid writer might.
The
cartesian to whom he appeals is not an idle
armchair theorist, whose intellectual concon
structions are divorced from concrete realireali
ty, from the active, lived experience. No!
He himself is p..1tting the ideas into pracprac
tice, which, indeed, is inseparable from the
theory that has been concocted to legitimize
it. This practice is being irnp::Jsed, brutally
and inhumanely, upon the animal Voltaire
represents as being like ourselves.
In him,
he declares, "there are the same organs of
feeling as there are in thyself (dans toi)."
The contradiction in the cartesian's theory,
which would be harmless and without conseconse
quence if it could be contained at that lele
vel, has nCM becane, in the cartesian's acac
tion, a IlIOnstrous contradiction of his own
humanity.
Moreover, by asserting the dog's
derronstration of friendship and love, a high
level of social relationship that the anthroanthro
pocentric cartesian would reserve for human
beings alone, Voltaire demolishes the cartecarte
sian's claim of IlIOral superiority and estabestab
lishes the contrary, the animal's superiorisuperiori
ty, not in the mJde
mJd.e of an allegorical fable,
but as literal fact, made apparent by this
confrontation of the dog's loving behavior
and the cartesian's insensitive brutality.

This part of Voltaire's
VOltaire's article is also
related in its thrust to other texts that he
p..1t together on the subject of the soul,
which he always took great pleasure in demysdemys
tifying.
In one of them, which appeared a
few years later (in Questions sur l' EncycloEncyclo
~,
1770), he repeated elements of the
article we have been discussing, but with the
difference that Descartes is named and that
what he calls "the strange system which supsup
poses animals to be p..1re machines without any
sensation" is identified as Descartes' "chi"chi
mera. "
(See "De l' Arne des Betes" ["en Ani -
rnals' Souls") in Dictionnaire philosophique,
Notes, pp. 428-9.) As usual, ridicule and
irony are his weapons as he IlIOCks Descartes'
unprecedented "abuse of the gift of rearea
soning" with his curious assumption that
nature gave animals all of our organs of
feeling in order that they might be totally
deprived of feeling! D:>ubtless, this was not
quite the way Descartes had p..1t it, but the
lurid clarity of Voltaire's way of spelling
out the grotesque implication of the cartecarte
sian argument effectively causes it to disdis
solve in absurdity, as his reader dissolves
in laughter, a technique that Voltaire raised
to the level of high art in candide and many
other pieces of philosophical fiction.

***
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was as much a man
of the Enlightenment as Voltaire, although
that. can be obscured by the fact that they
came to detest each other and by Rousseau's
progressive isolation from the other mainmain

There are in this brief article of VolVol
taire's sane further words on the question of
the souls of animals.
Are they substantial
forms, as Aristotle and Christian theologians
maintained?
Or are their souls material?
These pages may interest us less as a ccmnenccmnen
tary on Voltaire's conception of our relation
to animals and our obligations toward them.
They are, however, revelatory of his impaimpa

stream philosophes.
When Rousseau writes of
animals, it is in a very different voice from
Voltaire's, but it is all the IlIOre striking
that so much of their approach to the quesques
tion should be based on the same tmderlying
concerns.
Most important, perhaps, is that,
like Voltaire, Rousseau attached great imporimpor
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Rousseau
uses this distinctioo that
people are accuste:.tred to draw between themthem
selves and animals to develop an analogy with
distinctions people make aroong themselves:
"By extension we beccrne hardened in the same
way toward the lot of sane men, and the rich
console themselves for the harm they do to
the poor by supposing that they are stupid
enough not to feel it" (pp. 264-5). In this
way, Rousseau alroost slyly insinuates an
accusation of soc:ial injustice with the cascas
uistic justificatioo by the rich of their
wrongdoing into his argument about animals,
thus putting human apologetics for their
mistreatment in the same perspective and also
inviting redress for animals as a parallel to
the struggle for human rights on the part of
the impoverished mass of people.

kinship

Banal as it is to say, ooe cannot overover
state the importance Rousseau attached to
sentiment. For him (as for other "pre-ranan"pre-ranan
tics" of the eighteenth century) the capacity
for feeling deeply was a fatal gift, a guarguar
anty of pain, but also of !lOral value. ('!bat
gift, rather than learning or physical beaubeau
ty, was what attracted the heroine of RousRous
seau's novel, The New Heloise, to her young
tutor. ) in the Emile, Rousseau's chronicle
of a child's developnent into adulthood, he
cooducts the boy into adolescence, the paspas
sion and !lOral awakening of which are assoasso
ciated roore than anything else with the revereve
latioos of deep feeling.
The child Emile
had, of course, felt pleasure and pain, but,
like other children, had remained indifferent
to what was outside of himself. It is in the
birth of pity, experienced through the cries
and convulsions of a dying animal that the
child bece::Kres a man.
This is what Rousseau
calls his first "relative" feeling:

Rousseau's

developnent of this

analogy

strikes at assumptions that have been made
throughout history.
Aristotle, for example,
cast doubts upon the humanity of slaves.
in

beccrne sensitive and capable of
pity, the child must know that
there are beings like himself who
suffer what he has suffered.
In fact, how are we to allow ourour
selves to be rooved by pity tmless
it is by escaping fran ourselves
and identifying ourselves with the
suffering animal by taking leave,
so to speak, of our own being in
order to assume his?
(Emile, Book
IV, p. 261.)
To

It is surely significant that Rousseau
chose the spectacle of the death throes of an
animal as the event to awaken in his young
pupil a sense of kinship with others than
himself so that the erootion of pity may be
born.
He recognized that not all human
beings are rooved deeply by the suffering of
animals and speculated on why it is that we
can be roore hardened to their pain than to
that of other human beings, despite the fact
that the sensitivity that we share in cammon
ought to identify us equally with them.
One
cause, he believed, is the supposition that
animals are less endowed with either rnemJry
(of past suffering) or imagination (of the
future) than we are. And, thus, the animal's
suffering is judged roore limited
presumably roore canplex person's.

than

the enlightened nineteenth century, it was
cammonly assumed that working class men and
wanen lacked the sensitivity of the roonied
classes and suffered less fran hunger, cold,
and other deprivations.
Nietzsche, in a
curious passage of his On the Genealogy of
Morals, declared his solemn conviction that
Blacks ("taken as representatives of prehisprehis
toric man") can endure pain "that would drive
even the best constituted European to disdis
traction."
In a truly extraordinary sensen
tence, even for Nietzsche, he elaborated on

the
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this by no means uncamon idea that both
animals and the lower orders of the hunan
species are relatively insensitive to pain:

the Emile) will agitate on behalf of our
never harming another man "or even any sensisensi
tive being (aucun etre sensible)."

'Ibe curve of hunan susceptibility
to pain seems in fact to take an
extraordinary and abrost
sudden
drop as soon as one has passed the
upper ten thousand or ten million
of the top stratum of culture; and
for my own part, I have no doubt
that the canbined suffering of all
the animals ever subjected to the
knife for scientific ends is utterutter
ly negligible compared with one
painful night of a single hysterihysteri
cal bluestocking. (On the GenealoGenealo
gy of Morals, SecondEssay , Section

For Rousseau, this settles the ancient
disp..1tes on participation by animals in natunatu
ral law:
For it is clear that, deprived of
intellect and of freedan,
they
cannot recognize [natural
law];
but, since they share sarething of
r;:nrr nature through the sensitivity
wi th which- they are endowed, one
will judge that they too ought to
participate in natural right and
that man is subject to sore sort of
duties toward them.
It seems, in
fact, that, i f I am obliged to do
no harm to my fellow man [roon semsem
blable], it is less because he is a
reasonable being than because he is
a sensitive being; a quality that,
being camon to beast and man,
ought at least to give the one the
right not to be uselessly mismis
treated by the other (Ibid.).

VII. )

rbrds like these denonstrate the sadly inesines
capable fact that the brilliant Nietzsche,
capable of truly radical thought, was as much
a prey to ignorant superstition as the roost
benighted of his contemp::rraries.
We may, of
course, agree that people whose bodies have
been softened by inactivity and canfort may
feel the sudden imposition of pain roore aa
cutely than those who have had to accustor.
themselves to hardship.
But Rousseau's perper
ception of the canbination of bad faith and
prejudice in the rich person's lulling of his
conscience and of the analogous way in which
men make little of animals' suffering seems
far roore penetrating than Nietzsche's wild
thrashing, in which he takes on not only
animals but also African Blacks, intellectual
wanen, and all the impoverished masses unforunfor
tunate enough to be born below the top "stra"stra
tum" of European society.

We must, of course, recognize that,
despite his heretical deviations fran both
catholic and calvinist dogma of his time,
Rousseau was less estranged fran theological
conceptions than Voltaire and was, therefore,
roore disposed to deny animals both reason and
freedan.
Nevertheless, there are at least
two radical elements in this statement of
his. One is that animals have rights. MoreMore
over, the right Rousseau enunciates (not to
be mistreated by men) is conceived on the
roodel of eighteenth century hunan rights in
the sense that it is a defensive right, a
right that limits the freedan of the oppresoppres
sor to have his way with the victim.
More
than an "enabling~ right for the individual
for whan the right is proclaimed, it is a
"privative" curbing of previously uninhibited
powers of authority.
'Ibe fact that Rousseau
sees things this way is in itself a great
leap forward, even though he is willing to
limit the forbidden mistreatment to what is
"useless."

'Ibe argument in Rousseau's Emile is
readily relatable to passages in other wriwri
tings of his in which, for reasons both perper
sonal and philosophical, he attacks the ineine
qualities that have developed in hunan sociesocie
ty.
Probably the roost significant of these
is the second discourse of 1754 on the oriori
gins of inequality annng men. In the preface
to that work, attentive as always to the
importance of the pre-rational, he had ideniden
tified two "principles:" an ardent preoccupreoccu
pation with our own well-being and selfself
preservation and "a natural rep.lgnaIlce to see
any sensitive being and principally those of
our own kind (~ semblables) perish or sufsuf
fer" (Ganlier-Flanmarion edition, p. 153).
An inner i..rnp.l1se of ccmni.seration (assimil(assimil
able to the pity born in the fourth book of
Bm.WEEN 'mE SPEX::IES

'Ibe second radical element of Rousseau's
argument is his displacement of intelligence
or rationality as a qualification for animal
rights or hunan obligations toward them.
Jeremy Bentham will write just a few decades
later in words that sound like a crisp, concon
densed echo of Rousseau's:
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"The

~estion

is

not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk [as
Descartes had held]? but, Can they suffer?"
(Fran '!be Principles of M:lrals and LegislaLegisla
tion, 1789, quoted by Regan and Singer, ~.
cit., p. 130.)

cannot refrain fran fo=lating differences
that he has been led to believe IlU.lSt be
essential but stops short of permitting the
conception of those differences to legitimize
inflicting pain on animals, and, on the other
he clings to a perception of our kinkin
ship with animals as sensitive beings and to
our CXJIl1lOfl right to have rights in selfself
defense against oppression.
hand,

a matter of fact, declarations of
rights for human beings have not claimed them
only for conspicuously rational members of
the species.
'!be 1\merican Declaration of
Independence declared all rren equal
and
claimed rights for them all (even conceivably
including by implication future liberation
for wanen and slaves).
One after the other,
exploited and oppressed groups have asserted
and struggled for rights, winning them to
sane extent, no doubt, through the exercise
of tactical intelligence, but without relying
on a stipulation of intellect as a requirerequire
rrent for a<XIUisition of the rights in quesques
tion.
On the other hand, the denial of
rights has frequently been justified (even
very recently by amateur geneticists in the
United States, for example) by a claim of
intellectual inferiority.
As

The line of perceived kinship leads
Rousseau to deferrling the practice of vegevege
tarianism (Origins of Inequality, p. 163).
He finds that the structure of human teeth
and intestines puts us arrong the fruit-eaters
(les frugivores).
This, he suggests, is
evidence that, in the state of nature fran
which man has fallen, he lived (contrary to
Hobbes' grinmer view) in peace with his felfel
low creatures.
It is the flesh-eating aniani
mals that engage in canbat for their prey,
whereas vegetarians co-exist in perpetual
peace, as humankind might have if we had
remllned fruit-eaters and never left the
idyllic state of nature.
Thus does Rousseau
integrate the myth of a lost paradise where
we were innocent and happy with a serious
critique of the Plysical exploitation of
animals. In abandoning the bloodless diet of
fruits and vegetables, man symbolically forfor
sook peaceful relations with his fellow creacrea
tures on earth, cast the die for survival
through killing, and thus added violence
tcMard other animals to the other manifestamanifesta
tions of rroral degredation that Rousseau
associated with the historical evolution of
human society.

For Rousseau, this displacement is all
the rrore significant because of his acknowacknow
ledgement of man's intellectual superiority.
He believed that for animals instinct is the
rrotive force behind choice and action--peraction--per
haps, a bit as sane biologists today believe
it is the encoded message on a genetic "tape"
that has replaced the stars in arbitrating
human destiny---whereas man decides (in alrrost
Sartrean terms) through an act of freedan.
As often, the distinctions are scrrewhat murmur
ky.
Rousseau seens to follow Descartes when
he sees in the animal "an ingenious machine;"
but then he also speaks of the "human mama
chine, " and the contrast is no longer absoabso
lute.
'!be animal lacks intellect (lumi.ere),
but it is capable of conceiving "ideas,"
"because it has senses," and it is also capacapa
ble of canbining ideas. Proof, if we did not
have enough of it fran other sources, that
Rousseau had read John Locke.
But, here he
is applying Locke's notions on human underunder
standing to mindless animals 1

***
Although neither Rousseau nor Voltaire
may have achieved in its totality that "deli"deli
berate recognition" of animals' rights that
Henry Salt situated in the age of enlightenenlighten
ment and sensibility, their part in preparing
a climate favorable to it is at least as
important as Salt believed it was.
Both of
them rejected the absolute conderrnation of
animals to treatment as objects of insentient
matter.
Both, in their different styles,
argued for our acceptance of animals as felfel
low creatures, capable of thought and, above
all, of feeling.
Both wrote in an era that
voiced its horror of violence, of war, of
persecution, and of ignorant superstition and
intolerance.
Like Kant, both would have

One might see in these apparently concon
tradictory positions a sign of the awkward
dilarma Rousseau and other philosoPlers concon
front when they have inherited rroral reservareserva
tions about admitting their close kinship
with animals and yet are prevented by their
own honesty fran denying totally what obserobser
vation has taught them.
Rousseau seems to
arrive at an amalgam of concepts in which he

continued on page 24
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continued from page 9

troying the happiness of others. Thus, R2 is
at odds with both of our primary IlX)ral concerns, justice and happiness. Consequently,
nei ther premise of the pro-researcher argument is morally justified.

an end in itself,

although when Kant,

alas,

approved an ethic forbidding utilization of a
sentient creature as an object rather than as
declared that ''man can have no duty to any
beings except hwnan," what we knCM of both
Voltaire and Rousseau suggests very strongly
that at that point they would have parted
<Xmpany with this all too hwnanistic philoso];i1er and, like Schopenhauer, have found that
proposition "revolting and abaninable."

Conclusion
The pro-aniJnal argument, which would
prohibit all research with animals, is unsound, but so is the pro-researcher argument,
which would penni t any experiment on animals
which might benefit humms.
The reasons
against these arguments suggest the following
positive conclusions:

EDITIOOS Q)NSULTED
(i ) Fundarnentally, there should be just
one set of moral principles concerning research, rather than one set for experiments
on hwnans and another, weaker set for experiments on non-humms.

Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of
Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).
Tan

(ii)
Experimental sacrifices must be
limited to situations in which there is a
clear and present opportunity for making the
world a happier place and ImlSt be roade according to principles which insure that the
sacrifices are borne fairly by all those
likely to benefit fran the experiment.
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If these principles were adopted and
enforced, the abuses of animals which concern
proponents of the pro-animal argument could
be eliminated without canpranising the prospect of continued advances in knowledge which
concern
proponents of the pro-researcher
argument.
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